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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
1

.

1

Introduction

Each day we try to understand other people's
behavior.
Typically we are not even aware of this process,

but if we

are asked, we can easily explain the cause of
another

person's actions.

We construct such explanations even

though we lack omnipotent sight into the person's

personality or the true impact of the situation on their
behavior.

This act of attributing a cause to a person's

behavior is known as making an attribution.

Attributions

are a way people understand and eventually predict the

behavior of others.
A biased attribution can often be an event of little
significance.

At times though, our predisposition for

making certain kinds of attributions can lead us to make
poor and unfair decisions concerning others and potentially
even lead to acts of discrimination.

Understanding how

attributions can be biased or incorrect can help us avoid

misunderstandings and potentially help us gain a more
accurate view of the world.

1

Attributions are the result of a multistage
process.
According to the most basic model (Gilbert,
Pelhan and Krull
1988),

the first stage is when the behavior
is categorized.

First, we see the behavior and interpret it.

The second

stage involves a relative automatic association
of the

behavior with the person's disposition.
anxious is seen as an anxious person.

A person acting
Finally,

if we have

the cognitive resources and motivation, we may correct
that

initial dispositional attribution for mitigating information

about the situation.

The person may be seen as less of an

anxious individual in general when we acknowledge he or she
is speaking to a large audience.

There are two interesting interpretations that follow
from this model.

The first is that the only time that we

use the situation to explain someone's behavior is when we
are sufficiently able and motivated to do so.

The second is

that if we deprive people of resources, we can trick them
into making a dispositional attribution regardless of their

previous image of the actor.

This would be particularly

useful if we wished to force someone into making a positive

attribution about a person in a stereotyped group.

2

However,

.

when we dig deeper into the theories that
form the backdrop
of the process of making an attribution,
it appears this may
not be that easy.
Gilbert,

Pelham and Krull (1988) cite Quattrone
(1982)

as providing the basis for their model.

Quattrone

's

model

in turn builds on one of the basic concepts
underlying many

attribution theories which was derived from Heider
initial analysis of the phenomenon.

1958)

'

s

(1944,

This basic

concept is that when perceivers see a person perform a
behavior,

the person and the act typically are seen as

forming a causal unit and the perceiver responds with a

dispositionally-biased attribution
Thus,

actor.

one possible unit is between the act and the

This particular unit should occur frequently due to

the close temporal and spatial proximity of the act to the

actor.

The act-actor unit is also theorized to be a common

unit formation due to a general attribut ional set of

perceivers in Western culture to perceive the actor as the
origin of the act.

Cross-cultural work has achieved some

success in demonstrating that in other cultures the bias is
towards grouping the act with the situation rather than the
actor,

suggesting some other cultures may have, in general.

3

a situationally biased attribution
set

(Fletcher,

Ward,

&

A third relevant factor taken from
Heider involves
the perceived similarity of the actor
to the act.
Act-actor
units are more likely to occur when the act
is similar
1988)

.

to

the perceiver's preconception of the actor.

The possibility raised by Heider that such

attributional sets or expectations could result in a

situation-behavior unit rather than actor-behavior unit was
one of the cornerstones of the anchor-adjustment theory
of
attributional processing (Quattrone, 1982).

The perceiver

begins with an evaluation of the behavior, and then this

evaluation of the behavior is used as an anchor for an
estimate of either the actor's disposition or the situation,

depending on which causal unit is formed.

After the

behavior is used to anchor the estimate, the perceiver
adjusts this initial estimate for additional information in
the final step.

An elaboration of Gilbert's basic model by Krull (1993)

reintroduces the concept from Quattrone

's

model that the

situation and behavior can form the initial unit.

He

suggests that while our society tends to have a default bias
towards dispositional attributions, it is also possible for

4

people to follow an alternative process
where the
situational attribution is made first, and is

then followed

by a dispositional correction.
In Krull's mixed model,

outlined in Figure

1,

the first

step for both processes is the same as in the
three-step
model,

categorization.

However,

the second step depends on

whether a dispositional or situational goal has been
triggered.

The third step is now either a dispositional or

situational correction, respectively.
The new part of Krull's model involves the addition of
the situational goal process.

categorized,

After the behavior is

it is paired with the situation. Only later are

these attributions corrected due to deeper processing of the

person's behavior.
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Krull's Mixed Model
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In order to induce the different
goals, Krull

manipulated which process participants followed
by simply
giving them different explicit attributional
goals.
He

activated a dispositional goal by telling the
observers that
their task was to evaluate the person. To give
observers a

situational goal, the participants were told their task
was
to evaluate how much anxiety the interviewer's
questions

would provoke.
While this gives us an indication of how observers can
react differently when they enter the attributional process

with different goals, the question remains what naturalistic
factors could trigger the activation of these different
processes, especially factors inherent in the target person.
It is predicted that one possible trigger that could

cause a situational goal to be initiated, outside of an

explicit goal manipulation, relates to stereotype
activation.

The first two stages of the attributional

process are thought to occur almost automatically, so

anything that could have an impact on the initial steps of
the attribution process would also have to be relatively

automatic. Most research suggests that stereotypes are very

easy to activate, and can be activated by stimuli that last

7

less than a second,

(Devine,

1986; McCrae, Milne,

&

1989;

Bodenhausen,

Dovidio, Evans,

1994), which is less

time than the observed act takes to be
completed,

processed.

& Tyler,

let alone

Assuming that stereotype information can
be

activated relatively automatically, stereotypes
would likely
play a role in which process is activated.
The proposed model is depicted in Figure

The first

2.

stage of behavior categorization has been expanded to

include simultaneous, automatic stereotype activation.

When group membership is easily identified, a
stereotype may be activated which contains certain

assumptions and expectations about the person's disposition.

After the stereotype has been activated and the behavior
has been categorized,

these two components are brought

together in the next stage in an attempt to form a causal
unit.

This comparison stage is theorized to be still

relatively automatic. If the two components are congruent,
in other words they activate the same concepts on the

relevant dimension, then the dispositional-f irst

attributional process is followed and an act-actor causal
unit is formed.

Likewise, when the stereotype is irrelevant

to the behavior,

or there just is no stereotype,
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set.

process

will

be followed,

cultural attributional set towards
dispositional

explanations will result in an act-actor
causal unit and a
dispositional-f irst process.
However, when the behavior is inconsistent
with the
expectancy, a situational-f irst attributional
process will
be activated. When the act and the actor do
not
fit

together,

the observer experiences shock, disbelief
and

quickly turns to the situation as a probable cause.
Another aspect of the mixed model (Krull, 1993) that
remains to be tested involves a full test of what occurs

during the first stage of the situational-f irst attribution
process.

Unfortunately, Krull only explored the cases where

the situation was a probable cause of the actor's behavior.

He did not include conditions in which the situation was not
the probable cause of the behavior. Essentially,

participants in his study only saw a person who acted
anxious in response to interview questions likely to cause
anxiety, but not a person acting anxious in response to a
set of interview questions that would be unlikely to produce

anxiety. Since the situational information was uniform,

there is no way to judge if the situational information was

being evaluated as a causal source, or was just assumed to

10

be a causal source.

The participants rated the
situation as

highly causal, but the question remains

if

they would still

rate the situation as highly causal if
it were not a likely
cause of the behavior.
Krull

(1993)

does discuss this issue to some extent
and

concludes that while in a normal dispositional-f
irst process
the person is the initial focus of evaluation,
in a

situational-f irst process, it is the situation that is

evaluated first.

This would lead us to the prediction that

observers who are following a situational-f irst process and
see a person acting anxious in response to anxiety producing

questions will rate the situation as highly anxiety
producing.

They will use the congruity between the act and

the situation to conclude that the actor's disposition is
the same as the initial stereotype implied.

Observers

following the same stereotype driven, situational-f irst

process who see a person acting anxious in response to non-

anxiety questions will rate the situation as not highly
anxiety producing.

This group will use this incongruity

between the act and the situation to conclude that the actor
must be different from his or her stereotype group and make
a hasty dispositional attribution.
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After the situation has been assessed,
given time and
resources, the final stage of the
situational-f irst process
would be the dispositional correction stage.
The concept

of

a dispositional correction is still
unexplored.

In the

dispositional-first process, the observer's attention
turns
towards the situation.
In the case where the behavioral

expectation is due to a stereotype, a dispositional

correction involves the observer's attention turning

primarily towards the disposition.

This is especially true

when the previous stage has resulted in a dispositional
attribution.

After all, there is still some tension left

over from the lack of fit between the stereotype and the
behavior.

In this case, when the situation was implausible,

the actor is sub-typed into a category that allows the

behavior in order to preserve the overall stereotype Fiske
(

Neuberg 1986)

&

.

So we have a prediction for the case when the situation
is implausible

.

The case for when the situation is not

plausible is somewhat more complex since at this point both
the individual and the situation have been rejected as easy

possibilities.

If the situation is also implausible,

observer makes a hasty individuation of the actor, and

12

the

decides that they are unlike their stereotyped
group.
The
dispositional correction would be a motivated
response to
restore the stereotype and disregard the behavior.
In order to demonstrate the second and third
stages of

the attributional process, both the three-step
model and the

mixed model use a cognitive load to freeze participants at
the second stage while non-cognitively loaded participants
are seen as being able to reach the final, correction stage.
The two ingredients required for observers to reach the
final stage are cognitive resources and motivation.

Thus,

all participants are asked to try to come up with the most

accurate assessment of the actor's personality.

This

results in several counter-intuitive responses.

If people

are following a dispositional-f irst process,

they would tend to stop at the second stage.

behaving person is anxious.

However,

in real life

That anxiously

the motivation to be

accurate and the knowledge that others will be observing
their decisions pressures them to consider the situation in
the third stage.

Likewise,

for participants following the

situation-first process, we expect for people to strive to
be accurate by determining in the third stage that it is

13

possible that that the anxious acting
person really is
anxious despite the situation.
1

2

Summary and General Prediction s
One purpose of this study is to replicate
previous

research to provide further evidence of the
nature of
attributional processes and also to demonstrate

that this

study is addressing the same phenomenon.

A second purpose

is to extend Krull and determine if the situational-f
irst

process involves an assessment of the situation as

a cause

or whether the situation is merely assumed to be the cause.

A third purpose is to demonstrate that the situation-first

process can be triggered by something outside of direct

attributional goal manipulation.

The final purpose is to

explore the process of dispositional correction.
It is predicted that an observer's stereotype

(behavioral expectation) about a person can determine

whether the situation is initially considered or not when
the observer is deciding what caused this person to perform
a

particular behavior.

The purpose of the present study is

to demonstrate that congruence or incongruence between

activated stereotypes and observed behavior can lead to
different attributional processes.
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With this in mind, to test whether
stereotype-behavic.or
congruency or incongruency can affect the
attr ibut ional

process,

two actors were selected so that
stereotypes would

prompt different expectation concerning the
target behavior
(anger)

.

Expectations for the target behavior were either

congruent with the actual behavior (African-American
actor),
or incongruent

pretest.

(Asian-American actor) according to a

A second factor involves a cognitive load task

that is used to deny the required additional resources of

half of the observers in order to assess what type of

attributions they made before the correction stage. Finally,
a third factor is a situational plausibility manipulation

that included questions that could either plausibly provoke

anger in the average person, or were neutral and thus

implausible causes of anger. The situation implausible

condition is of special interest because it helps us
determine if participants are actually assessing the
situation to some degree in the first stage rather than just

assuming it is anger provoking.
To determine if participants were following a

dispositional-f irst or situational-f irst process it is

necessary to compare cognitively busy conditions.
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If they

show no difference in their ratings
despite viewing a
different situation, then they are using
a dispositionalfirst process.
if they do use situational
information
despite being cognitively loaded and rate
the person and the
situation differently depending on the situation,
then they

are using a situational-f irst process.

Third stage corrections can be seen by comparing

cognitively busy participants to their non-cognitively busy
counterparts who have been exposed to the same situation
information.

If the means differ,

then additional

situational, behavioral or dispositional information has

been considered.

For dispositional-f irst processes,

corrections are only expected when the situation was a

plausible cause of the behavior.
Dispositional corrections found in situational-f irst

processes are expected to be more complex.

In the case

where the situation was plausible, it would initially be
seen as the cause.

A dispositional correction in this case

would take the form of revising your perception of the actor
either to a sub-stereotype or individuating the actor so
that it is possible to view the actor's behavior being a

cause of the behavior.

If the situation was not a plausible

16

cause,

then the observer would have to
assume the

disposition was the cause without the
opportunity of
much consideration of the behavioral information.
A
dispositional correction would involve restoring

tc
:oo

the

stereotype and discounting the behavioral information.
1

.

3

Specific Predictions
It is expected that because of the content
of the

relevant stereotypes, cogni t ively-busy observers of an

African-American actor will respond with a disposi tionalfirst bias, while cognitively-busy observers of an Asian-

American actor will respond with
Thus,

a situational-f irst bias.

cognitively-busy participants who are exposed to an

African-American actor are expected to rate the actor the
same,

regardless of the situation, while cognitively-busy

participants who are exposed to the Asian-American actor are
expected to attempt to pair the behavior with the situation
and rate the actor as more angry when the situation is not

a

plausible causal source.
In contrast to the cognitively-busy conditions, non-

cognit ively-busy observers of African-American are expected
to adjust,

or correct,

their initial attributions, depending

on the plausibility of the situation.

17

When questions are

.

.

anger provoking, observers of the
African-American actors
are expected to rate the actor as less
dispositionally

angry
On the other hand, non-cognit ively-busy
observers of
the Asian-American actor are expected to
re-evaluate only
the dispositional dimension of their attributions.
When the

situation is plausible, the dispositional correction results
in sub-typing and a dispositional attribution is made.

the situation is implausible,

the dispositional correction

is expected to result in a moderation of the initial

attribution

18

When

.

.

CHAPTER

2

METHOD
2

.

1

Overview

Participants were exposed to one of two
actors of
different races in order to activate different
stereotypic
expectations before they read a transcript of
an interview
supposedly conducted earlier with the actor.
Half the

participants were depleted of cognitive resources by
being
told that they should underline, count, and memorize
the

hesitations of both the person interviewed and the
interviewer
Because employing two different actors could create

a

potential confound in that the actors could actually be

behaving differently, it was necessary to control for this
possibility.

Consequently, observers were only shown a

brief 5-second video clip of the actor, who was simply

sitting in a chair, filling out a short questionnaire.

Th

video clip was shown under the pretext of obtaining the
actor's transcript number.

Once the number appeared,

the

monitor was turned off, and the participants were handed
transcript in which the actor behaved identically in all

conditions

19

a

In five of the eight quest ion-and-answer
segments

the transcript,

the person who was interviewed
responded to

each question in a neutral fashion.
the segments,

ii
.n

However,

in three of

the person who was interviewed responded
in an

angry fashion.

Half of the participants read interview

questions preceding the angry segments that were
pretested
to be neutral.

The other participants read interview

questions preceding the angry response segments that were

pretested to be anger provoking.
After reading the transcript, the participants were
asked to rate the actor on both how angry they thought he

would be in general, as

a measure of the degree of his

dispositional anger, and also how angry these questions

would make the average person, as
his situational anger.

a measure of the degree of

The participants were next asked to

recall the number of hesitations in the transcript, and what
the actor looked like.

Finally,

everyone was probed for

suspicion and thoroughly debriefed.
2

.

2

Participants
The participants were 126 students at the University of

Massachusetts at Amherst who participated for extra credit
in psychology courses.

The racial breakdown of the

20

.

participants revealed that 88 percent were
CaucasianAmerican.
Because subsequent analysis showed

that there was

no difference in the results according to
racial background,
all participants, regardless of race, were
included in the

analysis.

The participant's gender also did not have
an

effect on the results; 85 participants were female, 41
were

male
2

.

3

Behavior and Actor Selection
To choose the stereotyped behavior and relevant actors,

a pilot study was conducted in which participants

(predominantly Caucasian-American) were given a free

response task and asked to list what they believed were

common stereotypes of people from various races.

The major

finding from these data was the existence of a clear

stereotype that African-Americans tend to be angry, while

Asian-Americans were seen as being polite.

This finding

implied that the behavior of anger would be a useful target

behavior to use since different groups prompted different
stereotypic expectations on this dimension.

In order to

activate these stereotypes in the study, participants were
shown one of two actors in a brief video clip,

followed by a

transcript where the actor demonstrated angry behavior.

21

The

.

first of the two actors was an
African-American.

It was

expected the African-American actor to
elicit an expectation
of angry behavior, which would result
in a
bias towards

attributing the anger he displayed to his
disposition.
The second actor was an Asian-American.

However,

because the nature of the Asian-American stereotype,
it was
not expected that the same bias towards a dispositionalfirst attribution would occur here.

Instead,

it was

expected that a situational-f irst bias would occur.
2

.

4

Initial Instructions

Before the participants arrived at the laboratory, they

were randomly assigned to one of twelve conditions.

On

arrival at the laboratory, participants were greeted by

a

male experimenter who gave a brief introduction to the
experiment, and provided them with an informed consent form.

The initial instructions stated that the participants would
be acting as coders for the experimenter.

A (non-existent)

previous study was described where athletes and academics
have been asked a series of questions.

These questions were

described to all of the participants as ranging from being
neutral to being designed to provoke a great deal of

emotion

22

Next,

they were told that because a large
number of

people were interviewed for over an hour, each
participant
would only see eight samples from one person in order
to

keep from overloading anyone.

It was stated that what was

being examined was the difference in emotionality between
people who do well in athletics, compared with academics.
This cover story was designed to reduce suspicion when

viewing different races in the videotape.

It was expected

the participants would not be surprised to see people of

different races after hearing this cover story, based on the
finding from the pilot study that some other common

stereotypes are that African-Americans do well in athletics,
and that Asian-Americans do well in academics.
It was also mentioned in the initial instructions that

the study was examining differences in emotion displayed

with body language, compared to emotion displayed through
the voice cues or emotion displayed through word choice.

this point,

At

the experimenter announced he would be rolling a

die supposedly to determine whether the participants watched
the video for body language cues,

listening to the tape for

voice cues, or reading a transcript for word choice cues to

determine the amount of emotion displayed in the interview.

23

After the die roll, all participants
were informed they
would be reading a transcript and were given
brief
"training" on how to evaluate a transcript.

The training

consisted of three basic techniques to assess
the amount of
emotion in a transcript. One method was described
as

recreating the interview by picking voices for the
interviewer and the person interviewed.

A second method

suggested searching for certain emotion-laden adjectives,
adverbs or curse words.

The third method concerned watching

for hesitations, which could be useful in detecting the

degree of emotion.

This final method was mentioned only

briefly for the non-cognitive load conditions, and was used
as an introduction for the cognitive load counting task in

the other conditions.
2

.

5

Cognitive Resource Depletion
During the brief training on how to evaluate the

transcript, all participants were informed that a useful cue
to use in judging how much emotion is being expressed is to

pay attention to the number of hesitations by the person
interviewed, as well as the number of hesitations by the

supposedly unrehearsed, naive student interviewer.

24

It was

explained that people hesitate when they
are feeling
deal of emotion and are searching for the

a great

best words to

express themselves, and in addition, the
interviewer might
be hesitating in reaction to a strong display
of emotion by
the person he or she was interviewing.

Participants in the cognitive busyness condition were
told part of their task consisted of underlining, counting

and memorizing the number of hesitations of both the

interviewer and the person interviewed in the transcript.

Immediately after they finished the transcript, they were
given a questionnaire.

In order to prevent them from

completing the third stage of the attribut ional process
during the brief wait, they were asked to rehearse the
numbers of hesitations until we reached them with

a

questionnaire so that they did not forget the number in the
brief interlude.
2

.

6

Stereotype Activation Manipulation

After the participants were given a brief training on

how to evaluate a transcript, the experimenter started the
videotape, which featured either an African-American, or an

Asian-American sitting in

a chair.

As if he was simply

trying to fill the silence, the experimenter off-handedly

25

mentioned that the person in the videotape was
the person
the participant would be evaluating.
The experimenter

then

explained that he needed to get the identification
number
for the transcript of person in the videotape.

Once the

number appeared on the video screen, the experimenter

stopped the tape, wrote down the number and selected the

appropriate transcript from

a file box.

In addition to the manipulation of the brief video

clip, which identified the race of the stimulus person,

the

transcript had either the name "Jamaal" or "Xiang" on the
front page above a fictitious participant number and

interview date.

The use of these names was meant to

reinforce the apparent race of the stimulus person (either

African-American or Asian-American, respectively)
2

.

7

.

Plausibility Manipulation
The participants were told that the questions were pre-

selected to either be neutral or provoke varying degrees of
emotion.

These questions were then supposedly administered

to the target person by naive interviewers who were

participants like themselves. Two transcripts were
constructed and contained eight questions and answers, with
one question-and-answer per page.
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The answer sections were

"

.

identical in both transcripts, and included
five neutral
responses and three angry responses. The questions
were the
same in the two transcripts, except for the
questions

preceding the angry responses.
condition,

For the situation-plausible

the three key questions were ones that were pre-

tested to be anger provoking, or were seen as likely to

provoke an angry response.

For the situation- implausible

(disposition-plausible) condition, the three key questions

were pre-tested to be neutral, and were not seen as likely
to provoke an angry response.

The questions covered the same topics.

provoking questions were:
friend
"

,

"

"

"

The anger

Have you ever betrayed a close

I'd like you to describe someone you hate

"

and,

Tell me about a mistake you made recently, and why you

didn't prevent it
were,
like,

"

"

.

"

The corresponding neutral questions

What are you relationships with your best friend
"

I'd like you to describe some other people who are

important to you

recently

"

and,

"

Tell me about something you've done

.

Following exposure to the transcript,

completed the dependent measures
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participants

2-8 Dependent Measure: Dispositional Anger

Participants were asked to rate how emotional
they
thought the person interviewed would be, in
general,

group of six scales.

on a

These six scales consisted of 11-point

scales anchored with the phrases very little and
very much

.

Above each scale was one of the following emotions:
sad,
angry,

relaxed

,

happy,

anxious, and pleasant

.

Only the

angry scale was of interest, the others were fillers.
2

.

9

Manipulation Check
Participants were asked to recall the actor's gender,

race,

and hair color to insure that they noticed the person

in the videotape.
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CHAPTER

3

RESULTS
3

.

1

Manipulation Check
All but eight participants correctly remembered the

race of the actor from the videotape.

The eight who could

not recall the actor's race were excluded from all analyses.
3

.

2

Dependent Variables

A multivariate analysis of variance with a
load)

X

2

(plausibility) x

2

2

(cognitive

(stereotype group) design was

performed on both of the dependent variables, ratings of the
actor's dispositional anger and ratings of how anger

provoking the situation was.
was found, F (2,110)

across all

8

=

A main effect for plausibility

12.125, p <

.001,

suggesting that

conditions there was a tendency to take the

situation into account.

the plausible situation

Overall,

was rated as more anger provoking with a mean of 5.1 versus
the average implausible situation rating of 3.338.

This was

qualified, however, by both a two-way interaction between

cognitive load and plausibility,

F

(2,110)= 3.836, p

and a three-way interaction, F(2,110)
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=

6.011, p =

=

.025,

.003.

Duncan pairwise comparisons were performed
on the
means and the results are summarized in Table
1

presented graphically in Figure
3

•

3

and

3.

Post-hoc Pairwise Comparison s

Comparisons between the cognitively busy conditions
where the question was plausible or implausible should

theoretically determine if participants were taking the
situation into account when they made their attributions.
As expected,

there was no difference for cognitively busy

participants who saw an African-American, suggesting that
they had not been able to take the situation into account.

However also as predicted, there was

a

significant

difference for cognitively busy participants who saw an

Asian-American actor, suggesting these participants did
take the situation into account when making their

attributions.

When the situation was plausible,

participants rated the actor's disposition as less angry at
5.69 versus 7.23 when the situation was an implausible.

Ratings of the situation demonstrated

significance with

a

p <

.10.

a

trend towards

When the situation was

plausible, participants rated the anger provocation
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Table

1.

Results

Means and

Cognitive Ta^k

Pairwise Comparisons

African-American Actor Grouos
Question Plausibility ##
Rating of Actor ###

ti

Cognitiveiy Busy

Not Cognitiveiy Busy

Rating of Situation ####

Situation

was

Plausible

7.31

Situation

was Not Plausible

7.33

was Plausible
was Not Plausible

6.00 -be

6.06

7.00 a-c

2.64 -c-

Situation
Situation

aa-

4.3

1

ab-

3.71 a-c-

—

Asian-American Actor Groups
Cognitive Task

Question Plausibility

Cognitiveiy Busy

Situation

Not Cognitiveiy Busy

Rating of Actor

Rating of Situation

was Plausible
Situation was Not Plausible

5.69 -b-

4.63 ab-d*

a-

3.23 a-c-*

was Plausible
Situation was Not Plausible

6.87 a-c

5.40 -b-d

5.94 -be

3.56 a-c-

Situation

7.23

= Cognitive Task was manipulated by having participants count hesitations in the question
and
answer. The two Cognitiveiy Busy groups should not differ when participants are following
a
#

dispositional-first process.

## - Question

Plausibility

responses. Situation

anger provoking

in

was

If

they do differ, a situational-first process

is

being followed.

was manipulated by changing the questions preceding the angry
means that the questions were perceived by participants

Plausible

to

be

a pilot study.

### = Rating of Actor was the participant's rating of the dispositional anger of the actor. Ratings
ranged from 0, very little anger to 10, a lot of anger. Means with the same subscript did not differ
significantly, (p < .05).
#### = Rating of the Situation was

the participant's rating of the degree that the situation was
considered to be anger provoking with 0 meaning not very anger provoking and 10 meaning very
anger provoking.

*

= Means

that both

have a

'*'

demonstrate a trend towards differing with a 2 <
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10.

Rating of the Actor and the Question

I

1

8

African-

African-

American Cog

American Non-

Busy

Cog Busy

Asian-American Asian-American

Cog Busy

Non-Cog Busy

Stereotype Group

[Actor

-

Situation Plausible

[Questions

Figure

3.

-

Situation Plausible

HActor

-

Situation Implausible

DQuestions

Results

32

-

Situation Implausible

of the question at 4.63,

while when it was not plausible

their ratings dropped 1.4 to 3.23.
A second theoretically interesting
type of pairwise

comparison involves whether non-cogni t ively
busy

participants rated the actor's disposition or
the situation
in a similar manner as their cognitively
busy
counterparts.

Cognitively busy participants are viewed as being
frozen
in the first stage of the attribution process,

while non-

cognitively busy participants are seen as being in the
second stage.

If the participants rate the actor

differently when they are not cognitively loaded, this
difference is seen as

a

correction for information that was

not used when the participants were cognitively loaded
(Gilbert,

Pelham,

&

Krull,

1988)

.

For participants who saw an African-American actor,

the dispositional-f irst correction for the situation was

replicated on both scales for the situation plausible
groups. Non-cogni tively busy participants rated the actor
as less angry than the cognitively busy participants with a

mean of 6.00 versus 7.33, and they rated the questions as
more anger provoking with

a

mean of 6.06 versus 3.71.

appears participants who were not cognitively busy were
able to take the situation into account.
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It

.

For participants who saw an Asian-American
actor, what

appears to be

a

dispositional correction was found for both

situation plausible and implausible groups.

When the

situation was plausible, cognitively busy
participants
rated the actor as less angry with

a

mean of 5.69 versus

the non-cognitive busy participants who made

and gave a higher average rating of 6.87.

a

correction

When the

situation was not plausible the pattern was the opposite,
where participants who were cognitively busy rated the
actor as more angry with

a

mean of 7.23 while non-

cognitively busy participants only rated the actor at 5.94.
The other Asian-American actor mean pairs did differ

somewhat,

although the difference was not significant due

to a large standard deviation.

While corrections for the

actor's disposition were expected in these mean pairs, the
exact direction was not specified.

Some possible

interpretations of these finding are discussed in the next
section
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CHAPTER

4

DISCUSSION
4

.

1

General
The basic model underlying this experiment
was that

congruency between expectations and observed
behavior can
determine whether people will follow a situational-f

irst or

dispositional-first attributional process.

A quick look at

the results confirms that the pattern of responses
was

markedly different for each stereotype condition.
people observe

a

person behaving in

with their expectations,

a

When

way that is congruent

dispositional-first process is

a

followed where the behavior is first assumed to reflect the
actor's disposition. The alternative mode of attributional

processing is where the behavior contradicts the observer's
expectations, and the observer follows

a

situational-f irst

attribution process where the situation is relatively

automatically considered as

a

plausible cause of the

behavior
The African-American actor groups were used to

demonstrate the dispositional-first attributional process.
These groups theoretically experienced little discrepancy

between expectations and observed behavior, and rated the
actor as equally disposit ionally angry when cognitively
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busy regardless of the situation.

They only corrected for

the situation when they had the cognitive
resources

available
The Asian-American groups were used to
demonstrate the

situational-first process.
a

They theoretically experienced

much greater discrepancy between expectations
and

observed behavior.

The cognitively busy groups responded

as predicted by making different evaluations of
the actor,

and to

a

lesser extent of the situation.

finding implies that when

a

In general,

this

behavior is incongruent with

our expectations, we are reluctant to re-evaluate our

beliefs concerning the person who committed the behavior
and instead will first scrutinize the situation for

a

possible explanation.
4.2 Previous Attribution Process Research

For the purposes of comparison to previous research on
the nature of attribut ional processes,

the African-American

condition replicated the dispositional-f irst process

outlined by Gilbert, Pelham and Krull (1988)

.

This is

encouraging in that it suggests that these paradigms are

addressing the same underlying phenomenon.
Another replication was of Krull's (1993) results,
while at the same time his findings were also extended.
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In

his original study,

situational was

a

he only used conditions where
the

plausible cause of the behavior.

This

study also included conditions where
the situation was not
a plausible cause to answer the
question whether the

situation was assumed as the cause, or if
cognitively
loaded participants were actually assessing the
situation
as a cause.

The difference between the Asian-American,

cognitively busy participants that read anger provoking
or
neutral questions suggests that in a si tuational-f irst
process,

the situation is assessed, not assumed as the

probable cause.
Thus,

this model can be superficially interpreted as

implying that the dispositional-f irst and situational-f irst

processes are mirror images of one another.
is one key difference:

However,

there

A dispositional-f irst attribution

means that the degree of attribution will be

a

function of

the degree of the behavior displayed due to the fact that

when we ignore the situation, the disposition can

practically always be

a

the initial behavior,

the situation cannot always be

plausible explanation.
results in

a

plausible explanation.

Thus

a

Yet,

given
a

situation-first process

situational attribution only to the extent

that the situation is

a

plausible cause.
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Since the

situation is not always
are similar,
4

.

3

a

plausible cause, the processes

but not identical.

General Attribution Research

Interpreting the ultimate attribution error
(Pettigrew,
(Hewstone,

and intergroup attribution research

1979)
1990)

findings with this revised model presents

us with a somewhat more complex picture.

It is now

necessary to divide this body of research into two types.
The first case would be where group membership of an actor
is not known initially.

In this case,

the end result,

in-

group enhancing and out-group derogating attributions,

would be the result of
with Gilbert,
However,

a

motivated correction in accord

Pelham and Krull's
in the second case,

of the actor is known beforehand,

would suggest that

a

(1988)

original theory.

when the group membership
the model proposed here

stereotype would be activated, and the

actor's behavior is then compared to the stereotype.

From

this point on, which attribution process is followed would
be

a

function of whether or not the behavior was congruent

with the stereotype.
the observed behavior,

activated.

When the stereotype is congruent with
a

dispositional-f irst bias would be

However, when the stereotype was incongruent,

situational-f irst bias would be activated.
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Motivation

a

could still play

a

role in the correction stages,

although

the effect of different groups and related
stereotypes is

likely not as clear- cut as previously thought.
4.4

Future Directions
One central issue left unexamined is the nature
of

dispositional correction.
has been described as

a

Here,

a

a

dispositional correction

correction where the observer

considers in more depth what they know of the actor.
Future research could confirm this in one of two ways.
First,

by varying the amount of information the participant

has concerning the actor and thus varying the

sophistication of the observer's expectations.

The second

method could remain in the realm of stereotyping and
comparing observers with rigid superficial stereotypes
versus observers with

a

rich variety of sub-stereotypes.

A second issue is that while the situation and the

disposition are reconsidered, no model takes into account
the.

possibility of the behavior itself being reconsidered.
Another third that could be expanded on in the future

involves the issue of motivation.

In this study,

a

cognitive load task was used that was intentionally
ambiguous to increase the plausibility of the cover story.
A cognitive load task that was less ambiguous would allow
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a

more detailed evaluation of whether or not
cognitively

loaded participants who were exposed to an
actor whose
behavior was incongruent with the observer's
expectation

responded by actually completing the first stage
then
allocating more resources to the attribution process
while
allowing their performance on the cognitive load task
to

suffer.

The motivation hypothesis is one main alternative

hypothesis to the one presented in this paper.

However,

the motivation hypothesis suffers from the fact that it

does not predict the observed corrections found in the

Asian-American, non-cogni t ively busy conditions, and more

specifically does not predict that these corrections would
be dispositional in nature.

Still,

an addition of a more

concrete cognitive load task would help resolve this
dilemma
A final issue that could be explored more in future

research is related to the concept of familiarity.

One

potential confound of the current research is that it

is

possible that participants were more familiar with African-

Americans and related stereotypes than they were with
Asian-Americans.

Thus,

it would not be a congruency or

incongruency between expectations and behavior that
triggered the observed processes, but rather the lack of
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familiarity with Asian-Americans that resulted in
the
initial apparent scrutiny of situational information.
Since familiarity of stereotypes is likely to always
be
real life confound,

a

it would be necessary to create

behavioral expectations for

a

target person that would

equally familiar to rule out this possibility.

It is

important to note, however, that this alternative

possibility would still imply that our expectations are
based on stereotypes related to race.

Otherwise

participants would have been equally unfamiliar with all
three actors used in this study.
4.5 Conclusions

This research demonstrated that, in the process of

person perception, stereotypes and expectations can

determine whether we first attend to the situation or not
when we are deciding why
way.

a

person is acting

a

particular

People who are involved in many tasks at once would

be especially susceptible to fail to correct their initial

expectations of another person's behavior by not having the
cognitive resources to attend to situational constraints on
the other individual.

Unfortunately, this suggests decision makers who are

overtaxed and are confronted with someone they expect to
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behave in

a

negative fashion will frequently neglect

situational information in their rush to make

a

decision.

When this person fails, he or she will be perceived as
failure,

and an alternative,

not be sought out.

a

situational explanation will

Likewise, people who are expected to

succeed will be seen as

a

success even if most people would

have succeeded in that situation.

Frequently, only when

people who are expected to fail manage to succeed, or those
who are expected to succeed somehow fail, will most

perceivers attend to the possible situational causes.
Since often in real life the situation will be ambiguous

enough that

a

possible cause for the unexpected success or

failure can be found, the research presented here implies
yet another way stereotypes can be reinforced and

maintained in everyday life.
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